COMMENTS

Beyond CTS A Limited Defense of
State Tender Offer
Disclosure Requirements
Only within the last two decades has securities regulation extended to tender offers. In 1968, Congress passed the Williams Act
in an attempt to protect shareholders faced with tender offers.
State legislatures have enacted regulations as well, in most cases
rather similar to those of the Williams Act. All these regulations
impose disclosure requirements on the offeror, substantive requirements on the terms of the offer, and general antifraud prohibitions
in connection with the offer. Where the entire federal and state
regulatory schemes have been brought into effect simultaneously,
courts generally have held the state statutes unconstitutional
under the supremacy and commerce clauses.
This term, in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of
America,1 the Supreme Court upheld an Indiana statute that severely restricted the ability of offerors to gain control of a target
corporation. Under the Indiana law, any time a person acquires
shares that push her total holdings over a "control share" threshold-20, 331/3, or 50 percent of outstanding shares-in a corporation subject to the statute, she must gain approval of both the target's board of directors and a majority of nonacquiring and
nonmanagement shares in order to vote her shares.2 In upholding
the statute, the Court ruled that a state, through its power to regulate shareholder voting rules, may regulate takeovers of corporations that are both chartered by the state and have substantial assets in the state.$ It is likely that many states will take advantage
1

107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987).
Management can delay the approval vote for up to fifty days. Ind. Code § 23-1-42-

7(b) (Supp. 1986). Thus, without the requisite approval, shares acquired in a tender offer
are useless for asserting control over the corporation.
3 For a corporation to be subject to the Indiana act, it must have substantial assets in
Indiana as well as either (1) more than 10% of its shareholders resident in Indiana; or (2)
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of CTS to regulate takeovers of in-state corporations in a similar
fashion to the Indiana law-through requiring that acquisitions be
approved by a majority of shareholders.4
Nevertheless, statutes that regulate takeovers by placing direct restrictions on the acquisition of shares will remain important.
First, most current state antitakeover statutes directly restrict the
acquisition of shares, and it may be a while before states can revise
their laws to take advantage of CTS. Second, some states that regulate the acquisition of shares may not wish to restrict shareholders' traditional ability to vote their shares freely.5 Third, there may
be some corporations, both large and small, with insufficient assets
in their state of incorporation to be subject to the type of regulation approved by the Court in CTS6 Finally, CTS explicitly authorizes regulation only by the state chartering a target corporation.
Thus, a state will be unable to use CTS-sanctioned laws to govern
takeovers of out-of-state corporations that have significant assets
or numbers of shares or shareholders within the state. This may
prove the most substantial limitation on state's powers under CTS.
For example, a great many corporations are chartered in Delaware
while their principal assets and shareholders are elsewhere, often
concentrated in one state.7
In the only Supreme Court case on the issue of direct state
regulation of share acquisition, Edgar v. MITE Corp.,8 a majority
of the justices found that the Illinois Business Takeover Statute9
imposed an impermissible though indirect burden on interstate
commerce. A plurality of the Court further found that the Illinois
statute placed an impermissible direct burden on commerce and
also violated the supremacy clause. In spite of the ruling in MITE,

more than 10% of its shares owned by Indiana residents. Ind. Code § 23-1-42-4(a).
4 The noted takeover specialist, Martin Lipton, predicts that thirty to forty states
eventually will eventually adopt statutes modeled after the Indiana act. Justices Back State
Curbs on Takeovers, Wall St. J. 3, col. 1 (Apr. 22, 1987).
5 The Wall Street Journal reports that there probably will be a substantial fight in
Delaware, the jurisdiction currently most important to corporate law, over whether to adopt
a statute similar to that of Indiana. Id. at 18, col. 1.
6 See CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1652 ("the Indiana Act applies only to corporations that have a
substantial number of shareholders in Indiana").
" Even so, states may feel that they have an interest in controlling the takeover of outof-state corporations with significant local interests. For example, the North Carolina legislature approved a measure that would require out-of-state companies with major North Carolina interests to obtain the approval of 90 percent of their shares in order to go through
with a takeover. See also N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-80 et seq. Robert J. Cole, Burlington Charges
Paine Webber Leak, N.Y. Times 30, col. 5 (nat'l ed. Apr. 30, 1987).
8 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
9 Mll. Rev. Stat. ch. 1211/,
137.51 (1979).

State Tender Offer Disclosure

1987]

however, the Court's recent decisions in Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc.10 (holding that the Williams Act is no more than a
disclosure statute) and CTS (limiting the preemptive power of the
Williams Act) call into question the ability of existing federal
tender offer regulations to displace state law requirements.
This comment focuses particularly on the situation with regard to target companies not required to register under section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act. The Williams Act's antifraud provisions apply to all takeovers; its disclosure provisions apply only
to registered companies, that is, those whose asset values or number of shareholders are above certain minimums. When these
thresholds are not met, and thus only the antifraud provisions of
the Williams Act are activated, the issue is more difficult because
there is a wider scope for state regulation.
This comment focuses on the constitutionality of direct state
regulation of share acquisition in these narrow circumstances. It
first analyzes both federal and state regulation of tender offers.
Next, it discusses the implications of the Supreme Court's MITE,
Schreiber, and CTS decisions. It then discusses state regulation in
light of both the supremacy and the commerce clauses. It first concludes that state regulation of share acquisition through tender offers that goes beyond the federal scheme does not violate the
supremacy clause. It then argues that state antifraud regulations
nonetheless violate the commerce clause as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. However, the comment concludes that
the disclosure requirements of these state statutes should still
stand because they are constitutional in themselves and are severable from the unconstitutional provisions.
I. TENDER OFFER LEGISLATION

The Williams Act 11 was passed in 1968 in order to fill a per12

ceived gap in the coverage provided by federal securities laws.

Before the act, when one corporation sought to gain control of another through either a stock-for-stock exchange or a proxy contest,
federal regulations required disclosure of that information believed
to be necessary to informed shareholder decisions about the op10

472 U.S. 1 (1985).

15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d), (e), (f)(1982), amending the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) ("Exchange Act"), by adding sections 13(d), 13(e),
14(d), 14(e), and 14(0.
12 Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1968).
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tions available to them.13 The cash tender offer, however, had become an increasingly popular method of corporate acquisition from4
the early 1960s onward, and it was subject to no such regulations.1
The Williams Act changed this.
The legislative history of the Williams Act reveals a sensitivity
to the potentially varied effects of tender offers on shareholders.
On the one hand, some offers were felt to "serve a useful purpose5
in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management.'
But Congress also conceded that the improvement of management
was not the ultimate goal of all offerors.16 The act was "designed to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at
the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case,' 1 7 while ensuring that these re-

quirements were not so burdensome as to effectively preclude the
possibility of the offer's success.' 8
Most state tender offer legislation, it appears, is also designed
principally to protect shareholders.' 9 However, the state laws are
not explicitly concerned with preserving equal opportunity for
both target and bidder to pursue their separate goals. An examination of the differences between the provisions of the federal and
state statutes is necessary to determine whether the variance is
sufficient to warrant invalidation of the state acts.
A. The Disclosure Requirements of the Williams Act
Section 14(d) sets out both a list of filing requirements for
13 Because they involve the issuance of securities, stock-for-stock exchanges were, and
still are, regulated by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982) ("Securities

Act"); proxy contests are covered by § 13(a)-(c) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa.
See generally H.R. Rep. No. 1711 (cited in note 12).
14 See H.R. Rep. No. 1171 at 2 (cited in note 12).
15 Id. at 4.

Id.
Id. See also 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (daily ed. Jan 18, 1967) (statement of Sen. Williams)
("I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the scales equally to protect the
legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders without unduly impeding cash takeover bids. Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor of management or in favor of the offeror.").
28 The most widely recognized way in which tender offer laws can prevent the success
of a takeover bid is to require delays and thus provide opportunities for incumbent management to respond to the offer. The Supreme Court recognized this as a significant concern in
MITE, 457 U.S. at 637-39, as have numerous commentators. See, e.g., Donald C.
Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62
Cornell L. Rev. 213, 238 (1977); Diane S. Wilner and Craig A. Landy, The Tender Trap:
State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1976).
1' See, e.g., 70 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 72 (Purdon Supp. 1985); 6 Va. Code § 13.1-528 (1985).
18

7
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those making tender offers, and several substantive requirements
regarding the terms of these offers. The scope of this section is
clear: only those offers for shares of a class of securities registered
under section 12 of the Exchange Act20 and made by persons or
entities who, upon consummation of the offer, would become owners of more than 5 percent of that class are covered by the 14(d)
21
provisions.

The filings required by section 14(d) must be made by the
time the tender offer has been either published or sent to shareholders. 22 The information to be disclosed is essentially that mandated by section 13(d) of the Williams Act: (1) the "background
and identity" of the purchasers; (2) the "source and amount of
funds" to be used in effecting the acquisition; (3) the plans of the
purchasers regarding any significant changes in the corporate
structure of the target; (4) the number of shares that the offeror
owns or has the right to acquire; and (5) any "contracts, arrangements, or undertakings" entered into by the purchaser regarding
the target's shares. 2s Additionally, all solicitation materials must be
filed prior to the time of their publication, and all information filed
with the SEC also must be sent to the target company before it is
published or sent to shareholders. 4
Section 14(d) also imposes three substantive limitations on the
terms of the offer itself. First, offerees who have tendered their
shares must be allowed to withdraw them within fifteen days of,
and after sixty days from, the commencement of the offer.25 Second, if within ten days from the time the offer is made, more
shares have been tendered than the offeror is willing to accept, she
must purchase all shares tendered on a pro rata basis. 26 Third, if
the offeror increases the price to be paid for tendered shares after
20 15 U.S.C. § 78(1). This provision requires all issuers of stock that affect interstate

commerce or are engaged in interstate commerce to register their securities if those securities are held by 500 or more shareholders or if the issuer has assets exceeding $1 million.
The minimum asset requirement for registration was raised to $3 million by Exchange Act
Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1986). Several types of securities, including those listed
on and registered with a national securities exchange, and those securities issued by investment companies registered pursuant to § 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, are
exempt from these requirements.
"115 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
:2 Id.
3 Id. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (providing for disclosure of information by a holder of 5 percent or more of the shares of any class of outstanding equity security).
24 Id. § 78n(d)(1).
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1986), enacted pursuant to Exchange Act § 14(d)(5), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
26 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6).
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the offer has been initiated, she must pay the higher price for all
tendered shares-even those tendered before the price increase."
B. The Antifraud Provisions of the Williams Act
Section 14(e) prohibits all "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices" connected with tender offers, including untrue statements and misleading omissions of material facts. 28 Pursuant to this section, the SEC has enacted a regulation requiring
that all offers be held open for at least twenty business days, and
at least ten business days after any increase in the consideration
offered. 29 The SEC also has promulgated an "al-holders rule," requiring that tender offers be open to all holders of a given class of
security.3 0
The scope of section 14(e) is the subject of some debate. By its
own terms, the section is applicable to "any tender offer,"3' 1 but
some contend that this language was a mistake and that those who
drafted and voted on the legislation supposed that it, like section
14(d), applied only to tender offers for registered securities.
Commentators offer several arguments to support this limited
reading of the scope of 14(e). 2 First, the "any tender offer" language of section 14(e) does not explicitly include unregistered securities, while the language of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example, states that its provisions cover
"any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered."" The clear language of 10(b) could
have been easily duplicated; that it was not suggests that the broad
language of 14(e) was not intended to be all-inclusive. Second, the
legislative history of the Williams Act often draws an analogy to
federal regulation of proxy contests, which applies only to registered securities. 4 A third argument against a broad reading of
'7 Id. § 78n(d)(7).
Id. § 78n(e).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1986).
SO See Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. §

240.14d-10 (1986). The Commission promulgated this

rule pursuant to, among others, section 14(e). SEC Exch. Act Release No. 23421 (July 11,
1986), corrected in Exch. Act Release No. 23421B (Sept. 4, 1986), reprinted in (Current)

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 84,016 (1986).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
" For an argument supporting such an interpretation of 14(e), see Alfred F. Conard,
Tender Offer Fraud: The Secret Meaning of Subsection 14(e), 40 Bus. Law. 87 (1984).
's 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
31

3,

See H.R. Rep. No. 1711 at 3 (cited in note 12); 113 Cong Rec. at S24,665 (daily ed.

Aug. 30, 1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) ("This legislation is patterned on the present

law and the regulations which govern proxy contests.").
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14(e) points to the absurd consequences of extending its scope to
the literal limits: foreign tender offers, exclusively intrastate tender
offers, and tender offers for shares in closely held corporations all
would fall within the "any tender offer" language. Professor Conard offers further support that 14(e) was not intended to extend to
tender offers for unregistered securities, pointing to several items
from the legislative history of the Williams Act indicating that
each of its sections applied only to tender offers for registered
35
securities.
None of these arguments is particularly compelling. In the
first place, the language of the statute is clear. An inference of implied limitations cannot be justified by a lack of phrasing precisely
identical to other portions of the act that purport to advance the
same purpose. Further, there is a significant distinction between
saying that one type of legislation is patterned after another and
saying that the two are alike in every respect. In addition, despite
the supposedly "absurd" consequences resulting from a broad
reading of 14(e), Congress has yet to amend the language of the
statute. Moreover, there is no reason why tender offers for unregistered securities should not be subject to the same antifraud regulations as those for registered securities. Finally, the pieces of legislative history Professor Conard points to do not discuss the scope of
14(e) in particular, but are instead general statements about the
bill as a whole. This does not compel a construction of 14(e) clearly
contrary to its language.
Both the SEC and the courts have favored the more expansive

35 40 Bus. Law. at 89 (cited in note 32). See 114 Cong. Rec. 21,483 (daily ed.
July 15,
1968) (statement of Rep. Keith) ("I state further there is a proviso which makes this not
apply to the corporation which does not qualify under section 12(g) of the Securities Act;
namely, a corporation with less than $1 million and fewer than 500 shareholders."); H.R.
Rep No. 1711 at 6 (cited in note 12) ("The revision of the amended subsection 13(e)(1) to
provide. . . that the issuer here being discussed is the same as in the other subsections of
the bill, namely the issuer of an equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to
section 12 of the act.") (emphasis added); Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 249-50 (1967)
(letter from Milton Cohen to Sen. Williams) ("Either as a further matter within the scope of
the Commission's rule-making power or as a separate statutory provision, there should also
be, of course, a prohibition against false or misleading statements of material facts or omissions of material facts necessary to make statements not misleading, in connection with any
tender offer within the scope of the section.") (emphasis added); H.R. Rep. No. 1655, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970) (SEC memorandum) ("[The Williams Act] consisted of amendments to sections 13 and 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('the act') and provides
for disclosure with respect to substantial acquisitions of securities registered under the act
and in connection with tender offers for such securities, together with protections against
fraudulent activities in connection therewith.") (emphasis added).
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reading of 14(e). In one no-action letter, the SEC stated that "the
provisions of Section 14(e), the antifraud portion of the Williams
Act, are applicable with respect to all tender offers, requests or invitations for tenders without regard to the class or kind of security
involved."38e This judgment has since been reiterated in several of
the Commission's releases3 7 and has been adopted in a number of
judicial decisions.38 Thus, both the courts and the agency created
by and entrusted with the enforcement of the act of which section
14(e) is a part agree that 14(e) should be read literally to apply to
all tender offers, regardless of whether the target securities are
registered.
C.

State Tender Offer Laws

At present, twenty-nine states impose some sort of direct regulation on the acquisition of shares in tender offers for corporations
connected in any one of a number of ways to these states.3 9 The
scope of most of these statutes is substantially similar. None of the
statutes applies to an offer unless: (1) the offer, if successful, would
result in the purchaser's ownership of a certain percentage of any
single class of the outstanding stock of the target; and (2) there is
36

Henry Heide, Inc., 1972-1973 (Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,838 at

81,836 (May 31, 1972).
37 SEC Release No. 33-6158, 1979-1980 (Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,373 at 82,581 n.7 (Nov. 29, 1979); SEC Release No. 33-6159, 1979-1980 (Transfer
Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,374 at 82,604 n.15 (Nov. 29, 1979).
38 See, e.g., L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 208 (6th Cir. 1985); E.H.I. of
Florida, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 652 F.2d 310, 315 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Unlike the
proxy regulations of section 14(a) and the disclosure requirements of 14(d), the anti-fraud
proscriptions contained in section 14(e) apply to any class of security.").
, Alaska Stat. §§ 45.57.010-45.57.120 (1986); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-1264 to 67-1264.14
(1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-456 to 36-469 (West 1981 and Supp. 1986); 8 Del. Code
Ann. § 203 (West 1981 and Supp. 1986); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 417E-1 to 417E-11 (1985);
Idaho Code §§ 30-1501 to 30-1513 (Michie Supp. 1986); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-3.1-0.5 to
23-2-3.1-11 (Burns 1984); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 502.102, 502.211-502.2156 (West Supp. 1986);
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-1276 to 17-1285 (1981 and Supp. 1985); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 51:1500-51:1512 (West Supp. 1986); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110c, §§ 1-13 (Law Coop. 1985);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 451.901-451.917 (West Supp. 1986); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 80B.0180B.13 (West 1986); Miss. Code. Ann. §§ 75-72-101 to 75-72-121 (Supp. 1986); Mo. Ann.
Stat. §§ 409.500-409.531 (Vernon Supp. 1987); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 21-2418 to 21-2430 (1983);
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 78.376 to 78.3778 (1985); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 421-A:1 to 421-A:16
(1983 and Supp. 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 49:5-1 to 49:5-19 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law §§ 1600-1613 (McKinney 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 78B-1 to 78B-11 (1985); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.041 (1985); 71 Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 431-450 (West Supp. 1987); 70 Pa.
Stat. Ann. §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1986); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 35-2-10 to 35-2-130 (Law Coop.
Supp. 1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 47-32-1 to 47-32-48 (1983); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 485-102 to 48-5-112 (1984); Va. Code §§ 13.1-528 to 13.1-541 (1985); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 552.01552.25 (West Supp. 1986).
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some connection between the target corporation and the involved
state. The statutes are roughly split as to whether the tender offer
must result in 5 percent or 10 percent ownership in order for the
restrictions to apply. 4" The most common test for determining
whether there are sufficient connections between the involved corporation and the regulating state considers whether the corporation is either organized under the laws of the state or has both its
principal place of business and substantial assets in the state.4 1
Many state statutes exempt from coverage issuer offers for their
own shares ("self-tenders") 42 and tender offers approved by incumbent management. 3
Like the Williams Act, most current state takeover laws both
require disclosure of information and restrict the terms of the offers themselves. While the information to be disclosed is for the
most part the same as that required by 14(d),4 4 the timing of the
disclosure often differs from that under 14(d). A large number of
states will not allow a tender offer to commence unless a filing has
been made with the appropriate state authorities some days or
weeks beforehand. 4 5 Additionally, most states allow the state official charged with the enforcement of the statute to delay the offer
by holding a hearing, if deemed necessary, to determine whether
4
the requirements imposed by the statute have been met.
With regard to restrictions on the terms of the offer, state

40

Thirteen statutes require 5 percent ownership. See, e.g., 8 Del. Code Ann.

§ 203(c)(2); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1601(a); 70 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 73. Fifteen states require 10
percent ownership. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-457(h); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1707.041(A)(1); Va. Code § 13.1-529(b)(i). One state requires ownership of 20 percent
before its statute goes into effect. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1276(a).
"' See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110c, § 1; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 451.904(1). Some
states have added to these tests a third factor: they allow application of the statute if a
certain percentage of the outstanding shares of the target corporation are held by state residents. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 35-2-20(5)(d) (5 percent). Some states, however, have
made efforts to limit the scope of their statutes. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80B.01(9)
(applying only to targets having at least 20 percent of their securities held by state
residents).
42 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-457 (h)(6); 8 Del. Code Ann. title 8, § 203(c)(3);
70 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 73.
13 See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110c, § 1; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d);
Va. Code § 13.1-529(b)(v).
" See, e.g., 8 Del. Code Ann. § 203(a)(1); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1603; Va. Code § 13.1531(b).
41 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 49.5-3(a) (West Supp. 1986) (filing must be twenty days
prior to commencement of offer); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78B-4(a) (filing must be thirty days prior
to commencement of offer).
46 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 451.907; N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1604; Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1707.041(B)(4).
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statutes are also in many respects similar to 14(d) and 14(e). It is
in the way in which some of these requirements are to be
met-most particularly, with regard to matters of timing-that the
state and federal schemes differ most importantly. Many states require that offers remain open for periods of time longer than the
federally mandated twenty days.47 Also, in many instances the
withdrawal provisions differ from those in 14(d). 48
Many state statutes contain provisions not found in the Williams Act. They commonly require that all offers extend to state
residents as well as nonresidents and that the terms of the offer be
substantially the same for residents and nonresidents. 4'9 A small
number of statutes contain provisions allowing those portions of
the statute found unconstitutional or otherwise invalid to be severed from the remainder of the statute without invalidating the
whole.5 0
II. MITE, SCHREIBER, CTS, AND
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WILLIAMS ACT

A.

MITE

The first Supreme Court case to deal directly with the conflict
between state and federal regulation of share acquisition through
tender offers is Edgar v. MITE Corp.,51 where the Court held that
the Illinois Business Takeover Act 52 violated the commerce clause
by placing an excessive indirect burden on interstate commerce.
Four justices, a plurality of the Court, held that the Illinois act
also violated the commerce clause by placing a direct burden on
interstate commerce, 5s and three justices thought that the state
law was preempted by the Williams Act.M
In holding that the Illinois act placed an impermissible indirect burden on commerce, the Court noted that the statute's de47 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 45.57.010(1) (twenty-one to thirty-five-day minimum open
provision); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 451,905(2) (sixty-day minimum open period).
3 See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 35-2-80(3) (withdrawal allowed any time within twenty
days and after thirty-five days from the commencement of the offer).
'9 See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110c, § 7; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.041(C).
50 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1284; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110c, § 13; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 421-A:16; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 49:5-18; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78B-11; N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1611.
51 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982).
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1211/2,
137.51.
53 457 U.S. at 641-43.
Id. at 631-39. In addition, three justices believed the case was moot, id. at 655-64
(Marshall, dissenting), and one believed that it failed to present a justiciable controversy, id.
at 664-67 (Rehnquist, dissenting).
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clared purpose, the protection of shareholders, did not justify the
regulation because the act affected shareholders outside of Illinois
and because the Williams Act provided all the protection shareholders needed. Furthermore, the Court indicated that the delay
made possible by the Illinois act actually might harm shareholders
in that it would allow management to defeat value-increasing
tender offers. 5 Implicit in this view is that shareholders benefit
from the ability to receive and freely evaluate tender offers from
bidders for corporate control.5
The four justices who ruled that the Illinois act placed a direct
burden on commerce noted that the state law by its terms could
have applied to tender offers in which none of the shareholders of
the target company were residents of Illinois. In addition, were
such regulations to be adopted across the country, "interstate commerce in securities generated by tender offers would be thoroughly
57
stifled."
Finally, three justices took the position that the Williams Act
preempted the Illinois act. They acknowledged that the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, to which the Williams Act is an amendment, allows the states to regulate securities so long as such regulations do not conflict with the Exchange Act itself.58 They further
recognized that, as is the case with most state laws regulating
tender offers, it would be possible for an offeror to comply with
both the Illinois act and the Williams Act. Thus, the main question
was whether the state statute substantially frustrated the objectives of the federal law. The justices found that the Williams Act
has two goals: shareholder protection and a careful balancing of
the interests of management, offerors, and targets. "Congress
sought to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the
necessary information but also by witholding from management
. . . any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an
informed choice. ' 59 Those parts of the Illinois act that allowed target management an advantage not found in the Williams Act were
preempted by the substantive force behind the federal statute.
This argument, however, was not adopted by the full Court, and
was undercut without dissent just three years later.
8 Id. at 644.
" See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1174-82 (1981).
67 MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
58 Id. at 630-31, citing Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a).
9 457 U.S. at 631-34.
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B. Schreiber
In Schreiber v. BurlingtonNorthern,Inc., the Court held that
misrepresentation or nondisclosure is a necessary element of a violation of section 14(e) of the Exchange Act.60 In so deciding, the
Court concluded that the only purpose of the antifraud provisions
of the Williams Act is to ensure full disclosure,61 presumably of the
information required by section 14(d) of the act. Accordingly, section 14(e) simply creates a cause of action for conduct that is defined elsewhere.
The effect of Schreiber on MITE is substantially to undermine the earlier decision: if there is no substance to the Williams
Act beyond the requirement of disclosure, it is difficult to see how
the act can have any preemptive force whatsoever.6 2 True, Congress may have wished that no state action affect the balance of
power in a contest for corporate control; however, many facets of
state corporate law do just that. In any case, Schreiber casts great
doubt on the preemptive capability of the Williams Act.
C.

CTS

In upholding the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Statute,
the Court in CTS did not reject MITE's commerce clause analysis.
Rather, it held that states have such great interests in the governance of the corporations their laws create that so long as they do
not directly discriminate against out-of-state shareholders, states
may control the way shareholders may-or may not-govern their
corporations.6 3 Also, the Court neither discussed Schreiber nor rejected the MITE plurality's argument for preemption. 4 However,
eO 472 U.S. 1, 2 (1985).
*l Id. at 11-12.
62 In fact, one might ask how a provision with no substance beyond disclosure requirements can be used as authority for the numerous SEC rules governing the substantive functioning of tender offers. See, e.g., Exchange Act Rule 14e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1986)
(requiring that a tender offer be open for twenty business days). While the Court in Schreiber noted that section 14(e) mandates that the SEC "shall . . . by rules and regulations
define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices" that
involve material misrepresentation and nondisclosure, 472 U.S. at n.11 (quoting § 14(e)),
much of the conduct regulated by the commission in relation to tender offers seems totally
unrelated to deception. For example, compare Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F.Supp. 1081
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (discriminatory self-tender does not violate the antifraud provisions) with
the new "all-holders" rule, Exchange Act Rule 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1986) (tender
offers must be open to all holders of a given class of security). It is hard to see how this
latter requirement prevents deception.
63 107 S.Ct. at 1650-52.
" Id. at 1645 ("[W]e are not bound by [the plurality's] reasoning. We need not ques-
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the Court in CTS seemed to limit the preemptive power of the
Williams Act to cases either where management is given an advantage in controlling the requirements of tender offers or where the
delay required by the state regulation is so long as to make impossible a successful legal tender offer. Finally, the Court noted that
were the Williams Act to preempt all facets of corporate law that
gave management an upper hand in corporate control fights, then
numerous provisions of many states' corporate laws would be unconstitutional-a result that the Court was not willing to contemplate.6 5 Fundamentally, the distinction between the MITE plurality and the CTS Court is that a restriction on the ability to vote a
share is not the same as a restriction on the ability to buy or sell it:
states may define the bundle of rights embodied in share ownership, but they may not directly restrict alienation of those rights. 6
Further, the CTS decision points toward a limitation on the
power of chartering states to regulate the takeover of corporations
they create. The Court in CTS noted with favor that "the Indiana
Act applies only to corporations that have a substantial number of
shareholders in Indiana,"6 7 suggesting that the power to use the
rules of corporate governance to restrict takeovers is conditioned
upon the existence of local benefits from doing so. This is important for two reasons. First, it means that unless enough states-or,
at least, enough of the principal chartering states-adopt the sort
of law approved by CTS, there will remain a significant number of
potential target corporations that are not covered by state antitakeover regulations. Second, the Court's emphasis on the protection of local shareholders suggests that in some circumstances
states may place small burdens on interstate commerce-in particular, direct restrictions on the acquisition of shares through tender
offers-in order to achieve this goal.

tion that reasoning, however, because we believe the Indiana Act passes muster even under
the broad interpretation of. . . MITE.").
68 Id. at 1647-48.
66 The restrictions in the Indiana statute upheld in CTS, because they are contingent
on transfer, are indirect restrictions on the alienation of shares-although the CTS Court
never called them that. See id. at 4486 (White, dissenting). While the distinction between
direct and indirect restrictions may seem thin, it has been accorded respect in the courts.
See note 84 and accompanying text.
67 107 S.Ct. at 1652.

670
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

A.

The Supremacy Clause

The supremacy clause provides that the Constitution "and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof.

. .

shall be the supreme Law of the Land." ' It is a neces-

sary corollary of this provision that state laws that conflict or interfere with federal laws must give way. Over the years the Court
has developed three rough categories of state legislation invalidated under this clause. The first category includes state legislation involving areas deemed to have been "occupied" by the federal government: that is, those areas in which the Court has
determined that the federal government intended to be the sole
regulatory force. The decision that a field is occupied, however, is
one that the Court will reach only with reluctance. As the Court
noted in Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, "[t]he principle to be

derived from our decisions is that federal regulation of a field of
commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory
power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature
of the regulated subject permits no other conclusion, or that the
Congress has unmistakably so ordained." 9
Second, state legislation violates the supremacy clause if it so
directly conflicts with a federal statute that "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility. 70° Third,
even when compliance with both statutes is possible, state legislation will be struck down if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."

1

None of the common provisions of state antitakeover legislation violate the supremacy clause. As to state disclosure requirements, section 14(d) does not apply to unregistered companies, and
therefore these requirements could not be said to be preempted for
that class of companies. But even the antifraud and other provisions of section 14(e), which do apply to unregistered companies,
do not preempt state antitakeover legislation. Congress did not intend that the federal government be the sole regulatory force in
the field of securities. As the Court emphasized in MITE, the Se68

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
69373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
70 Id. at 142-43.
71 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also California Federal Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689 (1987) (noting "sole task" of Court is to determine the
intent of Congress, and reviewing supremacy clause doctrine).
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curities Exchange Act of 1934 states clearly that "[n]othing in this
title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or
any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over
any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder." 2
State statutes therefore are not preempted by an express congressional desire to occupy the field.
Also, compliance with both federal and state law is not a
"physical impossibility." Certainly no state statute allows fraud.
Indeed, most states have antifraud provisions largely identical in
substance to 14(e).7 ' Direct conflict could exist only between state
laws and the regulations enacted by the SEC pursuant to 14(e).
The Supreme Court has noted:
It has been established in a variety of contexts that properly
promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the "force
and effect of law." This doctrine is so well established that
agency regulations implementing federal statutes have been
held to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause.7 4
However, the SEC's regulations and state takeover laws do not
contradict each other. While the SEC's requirement that tender
offers stay open for a minimum of twenty days differs from a number of the minimum open requirements in state statutes, 75 compliance with both is not impossible. If these conflicting standards are
indeed only minimums, then offerors may simply comply with the
longer of the two time periods, and thus satisfy the requirements
of both.
But state regulation also must not interfere with the realization of the congressional purpose behind the federal statute. A
longer minimum period may undercut congressional intent to leave
longer open periods to the discretion of the offeror. Recall that the
purpose of the Williams Act is to allow investors to make informed
responses to tender offers without creating an advantage for either
target or bidder management. Some evidence shows that, in Congress's view, the twenty-day minimum open period precisely
strikes this careful balance. In a 1979 release, the SEC indicated

72 Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), cited in MITE, 457 U.S. at 631. See also
CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, concurring).
73 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1609; 71 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 455; Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 48-5-106.
71 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1979). See also Paul v. United States,
371 U.S. 245, 250-55 (1963); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 668 (1962).
75See note 47.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[54:657

that it was considering a thirty-day minimum open period.7 6 Later,
the Commission stated that it found "persuasive the views of the
commentators who indicated that a minimum period of thirty business days is unnecessarily long. '77 Nonetheless, in CTS the Court
stated that a possible delay of fifty days-ten days short of the
maximum time a tender offer can remain open under the Williams
Act-would not be too long.7 8 Thus, it appears that a minimum
open period that is longer than twenty days does not upset congressional design.
Also, since Schreiber suggests that section 14(e) has no substantive force other than to prohibit fraudulent disclosure, the
main function of the regulations enacted pursuant to that section
simply cannot be to "equalize" the tender offer process.7 9 And as
the Court noted in CTS, numerous aspects of state law-such as
those mandating staggered elections for boards of directors and
supermajority requirements for mergers-tend to favor management in any contest for corporate control, whether or not that contest is conducted through a tender offer. The Court in CTS rejected any possible federalization of corporate law.80
B.

The Commerce Clause

1. The burdens on commerce from antitakeover legislation.
To the extent that they impede tender offers, state laws directly
regulating the acquisition of shares probably place an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. While Congress did not intend
to occupy the field of securities regulation, the scope of state legislation in this area cannot be absolute. It is limited by the commerce clause of the Constitution, which gives to Congress the
power "[tlo regulate Commerce. . . among the several States."8 " It
71 SEC Release No. 33-6022, 1979 (Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %81,935
at 81,236 (Feb. 5, 1979).
7 SEC Release No. 33-6158 at 82,595 (cited in note 37).
78 CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1647 ("We cannot say that a delay within that congressionally
determined period is unreasonable.").
79 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 9, notes that Congress intended to strike a balance, but it does
not follow that Congress meant that balance to be maintained by the states.
8o See text at note 65. See also Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705,
718 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Dynamics II"), in which the court regarded as frivolous arguments that
state rules of corporate law authorizing a board of directors to adopt a "flip in" poison pill
defense to a takeover attempt were unconstitutional. Ironically, the same panel had earlier
held that the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act was unconstitutional under both the
supremacy and the commerce clauses. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS, 794 F.2d 250,
263-64 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Dynamics I"), rev'd by CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1637.
81 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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has long been recognized that this grant of power contains an implicit limitation on states' power to enact legislation that interferes
with interstate commerce, even when no conflicting federal statute
82
exists.
Although the extent of this limitation has been the subject of
lengthy debate, certain general principles are discernible. In Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Court offered these guidelines:
Where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits.8 3
The Court's approval of "incidental" effects on commerce seems
indistinguishable from its intermittent approval of "indirect" effects of state legislation on commerce. 8 ' The "direct/indirect" test,
however, has proved to be of little use. As the Court itself has
pointed out, "[t]he line of division between direct and indirect restraints of commerce involves in its marking a reference to considerations of degree."8 " Accordingly, the inquiry into "incidental" effects collapses into the balancing test set out in the final clause of
the Pike formulation, which prohibits state burdens on commerce
that are "clearly excessive" in relation to the purported benefits of
the legislation imposing the burden.
After Pike, four factors are important in determining the validity of a state statute under the commerce clause.8 First, the
state statute must be "evenhanded"-that is, it must extend identically to residents and nonresidents. 7 Second, the state interest
82 See, e.g., MITE, 457 U.S. at 640; Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S.
27, 35 (1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978); A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976).
83 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443

(1960).
8'4 See, e.g., Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 188, 199 (1925); Smith v. Alabama,
124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888).
85 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935).
86 It is somewhat misleading to categorize the varied approaches to commerce clause

analysis as a series of "tests." As Professor Tribe said of commerce clause jurisprudence,
"these doctrines ...
suggest that the Supreme Court has preserved them with an eye to
their discretionary application in order to prevent what appear to be instances of intolerable
local or state interference with interstate markets." Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 343 (1978).
87 See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1978)
(although not decisive, exceptions in state statute benefiting primarily local concerns "undermine the assumption that the State's own political processes will act as a check on local
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must be "legitimate," or an appropriate state concern. 8 Third, the
local benefits that the statute purportedly advances must outweigh
the burden imposed upon interstate commerce;8 9 and finally, the
state statute must be the least intrusive means available for
achieving these local benefits.9 0
State takeover regulations often are not evenhanded. The
most acute example of discrimination is the exemption for self-tenders.9 1 While the imposition of different standards for the target-which must have at least some connection to the state-and
the bidder has never served as the sole basis for the invalidation of
a state statute, it "tends to undermine [the state's] justification for
the burdens the statute imposes on interstate commerce." 9 2 A second, somewhat less common, type of statutory provision that imposes discriminatory regulations is that which exempts "friendly"
tender offers-that is, those approved by the target board-from
statutory coverage.9 3 Such provisions undermine the purported justification of shareholder protection because-as is also the case
with the self-tender exception-they substitute the judgment of
the target corporation for that of the shareholder.
The protection of shareholders is a valid state concern.94 Just
as the federal government seeks to ensure that shareholders' decisions are made with adequate knowledge and without undue time
pressure, so may the states help local investors in this way. One
type of provision clearly tailored to aid local shareholders is a requirement that tender offers be made to residents as well as nonresidents on substantially the same terms.9 5 More problematic,

regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce"); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-52 (1977) (requirement that containers of imported apples
contain either all or no USDA-grade produce necessitates repackaging that results in artificially higher costs for out-of-state growers).
88 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) ("environmental protection and resource conservation" are legitimate local concerns); S.C. State Hwy.
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938) ("Few subjects of state regulation are so
peculiarly of local concern as is the use of state highways.").
8 See, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71
(1945).
90 See, e.g., Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336; Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56
(1951).
" See note 42 and accompanying text.
82 MITE, 457 U.S. at 644.
8' See note 43.
84 See, e.g., MITE, 457 U.S. at 644; Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
1256, 1283 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds as Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,
443 U.S. 173 (1979).
8 See note 49.
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however, are state statutes that could apply to transactions between two nonresidents, at least where the corporations in which
they hold shares are nonresidents.96
States also enact tender offer legislation in order to preserve
the various local benefits arising from the presence of a corporate
headquarters or other facility within the state. This goal has been
regarded as legitimate by most courts, with the Fifth Circuit noting that "a corporation can influence local lifestyle through such
means as charitable contributions or civil involvement and the
depth of its commitment to issues such as pollution control or job
safety. '9 7 Nevertheless, this justification seems somewhat suspect.
While it is no doubt in a state's interest to keep within its borders
the economic and intangible benefits that responsible corporations
provide, such protectionism seems to be precisely what the commerce clause was intended to prevent."8 In sum, while the protection of local shareholders is indeed a legitimate local concern, it is
at least arguable that keeping corporations within the state is not.
The next line of inquiry is whether the burdens that these
state statutes impose on interstate commerce are clearly excessive
in relation to their putative local benefits. While shareholder protection is a legitimate local benefit from state statutes, state disclosure requirements may not promote it. Some courts have suggested that these requirements, to the extent they exceed federal
specifications, may provide shareholders with so much information
that they are confused rather than enlightened.9 9 Also, since section 14(e) of the Williams Act applies to all tender offers, no statemandated disclosure may be fraudulent or misleading. Furthermore, any state regulation-even if it is merely a disclosure requirement-that goes beyond section 14(d)'s requirements makes a
bid for corporate control more expensive and may place too great a

MITE's statement on this point, see 457 U.S. at 644, must be limited in light of the
Court's recent qualification in CTS, 107 S.Ct. at 1651, that a state "has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of non-resident corporations" (emphasis in original).
" Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1282-83. See also MITE, 457 U.S. at 646 n.* (Powell, concurring
in part).
s See, e.g., Pike, 397 U.S. 137 (holding unconstitutional a state statute that would
have required the packing of cantaloupes in state and was specifically aimed at ending a
common practice of having the fruit shipped elsewhere for that purpose). Cases disallowing
states from enacting statutes restricting the export of certain scarce resources are analogous.
See, e.g., Hughes, 441 U.S. 322 (Oklahoma statute prohibiting export of minnows, a natural
resource of the state).
" National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1131 (8th Cir. 1982); MITE
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 500 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd by MITE, 457 U.S. at 624; Kidwell,
577 F.2d at 1285.
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burden on shareholders, both in and out of state, who have a federally recognized interest in receiving tender offers.
State takeover statutes impose significant burdens on interstate commerce in several ways. First, economic inequality results
when nonnegotiated bids are subject to statutory regulations while
target self-tenders and management-approved bids are not. Also,
some states regulate transactions between parties entirely unconnected with the state, and some limit shareholders' ability to sell
their stock at the highest available price by disallowing or fatally
delaying certain tender offers. 0 0
The burden that such state statutes place on interstate commerce is systemic. Tender offers may be severely discouraged by
the uncertain success and potentially high costs associated with offers made for shares of a company located in a state with a takeover statute. 10 These impediments may reduce economic efficiency. Deterring potential offers and disallowing some initiated
offers hinders what MITE found to be an important function of
tender offers: "[t]he reallocation of economic resources to their
highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and
competition."'' 2
The literature on tender offers is extensive and varied; however, most economists and economically oriented lawyers agree
1 03
that on the whole, target shareholders benefit from tender offers.
Furthermore, even in those cases where resistance to a tender offer
benefits the target's shareholders,' 0 ' this comes at a cost. The offeror's shareholders lose to the same extent that the target's shareholders benefit and overall, fewer tender offers will occur, which
harms all shareholders in the long run.0 5 In addition, the danger
exists, as noted by the plurality in MITE, that restrictive state
06
laws will stifle the entire interstate market for corporate control.
110

See, e.g., MITE, 457 U.S. at 643; Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580 (4th

Cir. 1983). Again, CTS noted that a restriction on the ability to vote a share is not the same
as a restriction on its sale or purchase. 107 S.Ct. at 1652.
101 Televest, 697 F.2d at 580.
102

457 U.S. at 643.

For an article by scholars in the forefront of empirical work on tender offers, see
Michael Bradley, Anand Desai, and E. Han Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender
Offers: Information or Synergy?, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 183 (1983).
104 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers,
95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028 (1982).
101 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in
Tender Offers, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982). For a recent judicial discussion of the economics of
tender offers, see Dynamics I, 794 F.2d at 253-54.
10 MITE, 457 U.S. at 642; Dynamics I, 794 F.2d at 264 ("an interstate, indeed international, market that the State.. . is not authorized to opt out of").
103
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To the extent that tender offers are hindered, incumbent management operates without an important check on performance.10 7 Although CTS does seem to question the economic desirability of
tender offers, the basis of that decision is that a state's interest in
regulating the voting rights of shares in the corporations it creates
more than outweighs any possible benefits to interstate commerce
from tender offers.108
Finally, even if the interest in keeping corporate headquarters
within the state is legitimate under the commerce clause, tender
offer legislation is an excessively discriminatory means of protecting this interest. Some of the advantages accruing from the civic
responsibility of local corporations could be achieved through state
legislative health and safety regulations as well as state tax incentives to encourage community support and charitable contributions.10 9 The availability of these approaches reduces the state's
need to burden interstate commerce through tender offer
regulation.
2. The special case of state disclosure requirements.The unnecessary burdens caused by state antitakeover statutes, when considered in situations where the disclosure requirements of section
14(d) are in effect, have moved courts to resolve the balancing of
state versus interstate interests against the states.11 0 State-mandated disclosure requirements, however, are another story. These
are permissible under the commerce clause, at least with regard to
unregistered companies, because the federal disclosure requirements of section 14(d) do not reach these companies, and because
disclosure in general places a less onerous burden on the offeror
than do other provisions of antitakeover laws.
Only one court has considered the constitutional issues in
these narrow circumstances. In L. P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, the
Sixth Circuit acknowledged the burdens that the Michigan TakeOver Offers Act' placed on interstate commerce, but the court
nevertheless found that the state interests in protecting both local
shareholders and non-shareholding residents outweighed these
burdens.1 1 2 This result seems correct. In the first place, it is unreal-

10

MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.

108 107 S.Ct. at 1652.

109 Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1286.
110 MITE, 457 U.S. 624; Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.
1984); Mesa Petroleum, 715 F.2d 1425; Televest, 697 F.2d 576; Martin-Marietta, 690 F.2d
558; National City Lines, 687 F.2d 1122; Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256.
"I Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 451.901-451.917 (West Supp. 1986).
1-2 772 F.2d 201, 207 (6th Cir. 1985). The statute was struck down, however, as a violation of the supremacy clause. Id. at 209.
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istic to contend that shareholders will be confused rather than
aided by information additional to that mandated by the Williams
Act. As a preliminary matter, most statutory disclosure requirements do not exceed those of section 14(d), but rather are largely
similar to them."' One state statute has already been upheld on
these grounds.1 4 More to the point, it appears highly likely that
any investor astute enough to derive useful information about the
projected market value of a share of stock from disclosures required by section 14(d) will be able to do the same if additional
information is provided.
Even if shareholders are perplexed by some of the information
required under some state statutes, that confusion may be a small
price to pay for the benefits arising from state requirements to disclose useful information in the absence of any overlapping federal
requirements. With no disclosure requirements, shareholders may
be forced to make hasty investment decisions with virtually no
knowledge of the offeror's background, intentions regarding the
target, or financing arrangements. This lack of information could
cause shareholders to forego other sale opportunities while tendering their stock to an offeror whose financing is inadequate to fund
the entire deal.
Further, the information disclosed to target shareholders may
be more valuable in the case of smaller, largely local targets than
when the target is a large national or multinational corporation.
Shares may be tendered to an offeror who intends to liquidate assets of the target corporation when the target could be a significant
employer in the area where the shareholder lives, or indeed even
be the shareholder's own employer. The investor may find herself
unknowingly aiding the transfer of a local corporation into the
hands of management unresponsive to community needs and
desires.
Lastly, whatever the burdens imposed by such legislation on
interstate commerce, they are probably less significant in situations where 14(d) does not apply. Either the corporations involved
have fewer assets, or their stock is held by fewer shareholders than
targets covered by 14(d). Thus, both in terms of the number of
dollars affected and the number of individuals affected, the impediment to the free flow of commerce is not as severe.
113 See note 44
114 Cardiff, 751

1986).

and accompanying text.
F.2d at 912, upholding Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 80B.01-80B.13 (West Supp.
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It is important to note, however, that while the cost to bidders
of disclosure requirements may be less than the cost and uncertainty created by antifraud regulations and restrictions on the
terms of the offer itself, disclosure requirements nonetheless may
have a disproportionate effect on smaller tender offers. Because
the target firms are smaller, the profits the offeror can expect from
a successful bid will likely also be smaller. If the cost of compliance
with disclosure requirements does not fall at least in proportion to
the size of the takeover involved, disclosure costs (like other relatively fixed costs of undertaking any tender offer) will discourage
offers for smaller firms more than offers for larger firms. Although
disproportionate effects on smaller firms may be worrisome, no
empirical evidence shows them to be significant. Further, the
courts have rejected commerce clause challenges to the disclosure
requirements of state "blue sky" securities laws' 1 5-laws that present the same problem.
Given that shareholders of unregistered companies are able to
benefit from section 14(e), which sets out both antifraud and substantive rules for tender offers, a state needs only disclosure requirements to protect its shareholders in the event of a tender offer for an unregistered company. There is seldom an acceptable
justification for removing corporate assets from the interstate market for control.11 6
IV.

SEVERABILITY

It seems odd, however, to conclude that the state antitakeover
statutes are constitutional only when the Williams Act's disclosure
or substantive requirements do not apply. In these circumstances,
invalidation of the only means of shareholder protection may be
more troubling than delaying and discouraging tender offers. Indeed, in deciding a case involving a claim for fraud under both
14(e) and Rule 10b-6, the Supreme Court found the congressional
concern for neutrality as to targets and bidders to be of clearly
secondary importance:
Congress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in
contests for control, but its policy of evenhandedness does not
go . . . to the purpose of the legislation. . . . Neutrality is,
rather, but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a
I'l

See, for example, Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
11 See MITE, 457 U.S. at 644. Again, after CTS, a restriction on voting a share does
not remove the asset represented by the share from commerce.
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different purpose-the protection of investors. 117
To invalidate an entire disclosure statute because one of its provisions is problematic would undermine Congress's intent to provide
disclosure.
The doctrine of severability provides one way of avoiding this
dilemma. In appropriate instances, the unconstitutional portion of
a statute can be excised, leaving the remainder unaffected. After
severance of the unconstitutional sections from state takeover statutes, the investor could enjoy essentially the same protection
whether or not 14(d) applies. Where the federal law does not extend, state laws can fill the void.
The criteria for allowing severability are fairly well-settled and
argue for its use in state tender offer statutes. The focus is primarily on legislative intent, and the Court has indicated that there
should be a presumption that statutes are severable:
Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if
what is left is fully operative as a law. 1 8
The unconstitutional provisions of a state tender offer statute
could be severed from its disclosure provisions without rendering
the disclosure rules "inoperative as law." None of the state statutes
indicate that any provision was intended to be dependent on any
other. Further, there is no reason that enforcement of only the disclosure requirements of any state statute would present an illogical
or ineffective response to the concerns that either explicitly or implicitly gave rise to their creation. In short, such statutes could and
should remain operative.
With regard to the intent of the state legislatures that enacted
these statutes, it is unlikely that they would have refused to approve independently each of the remaining portions. Indeed, a few
1 Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977).

Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). See Regan
v. Time, Inc., 468 S.Ct. 641, 653 (1984) (Champlin followed); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
934 (1983) (presumption of severability); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-09 (1976)
(Champlin followed). It should be noted that in Regan and Buckley the statutes under
consideration were federal, and in Chadha, federal regulations were at issue. The Champlin
decision, however, involved the severing of a state statute. Because the later decisions made
no mention of this difference, it is reasonable to assume that the distinction is of no import
and thus that the rules regarding severability of state statutes are no different from those
regarding federal statutes.
"~
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states have expressly allowed for severability. 119 As to the others, it
is unlikely that one section containing a minimum open period requirement for tender offers would have been considered so indispensable by the legislature that enacted it that the disclosure provisions would not have been passed in its absence; enforcement of
the disclosure provisions still serves the purpose of investor protection professed by most of the states enacting these provisions. It is
certainly not "evident" that these truncated statutes would not
have been approved.
Thus, it seems both appropriate and desirable to apply the
doctrine of severability to preserve the disclosure requirements
when other parts of state takeover statutes are found unconstitutional. This results not only in the achievement of the primary
goals of both state and federal legislation, but also in the extension
of protection to investors not otherwise covered by the Williams
Act.

CONCLUSION

Although CTS recognizes states' power to regulate takeovers
of corporations they charter, this power is of no use to states in
controlling takeovers of out-of-state corporations with substantial
local interests. Further, a chartering state's power to regulate takeovers might be conditioned on other state interests: if the corporation the state creates has no significant assets, number of shareholders, or concentration of shares within the state, CTS may not
apply.
These interstices are particularly problematic when a target
corporation is not covered by the disclosure provisions of the Wlliams Act. In situations where tender offers are subject to only the
requirements of section .14(e) of the Williams Act, unlike those in
which both 14(d) and 14(e) apply, target shareholders need not be
left without protection. While state restrictions on the terms of the
offer are unconstitutional because they burden the interstate market for corporate control by aiding incumbent management, the
doctrine of severability should be used to excise only those provi-

"' See

note 50 and accompanying text.
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sions of the state legislation. Shareholders should still be protected
by the state disclosure laws that, in the absence of the protection
afforded by section 14(d), may provide beneficial information to
shareholders.
Steven Gitelman

